Research Article

The Impact of the Parameter Individualism versus Collectivism on the Formation of Behavioural Characteristics in People of Various National Cultures[1]

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Abstract. Different theories of cross-cultural communication developed by researchers in the field of humanities including cultural anthropology, social psychology, cognitive science, etc., offer a variety of ways to classify national cultures. At the same time, many agree that there is a need to find clear and measurable fundamental parameters that underlie any national culture. This article substantiates the use of the parameter of "individualism versus collectivism," which has already been tested in the framework of anthropology and philosophy of culture with regard to both Western and non-Western cultures, as an effective method of cultural comparison. In this paper, we aim to give an overview of various theories of cross-cultural interaction and their elements, examine where they overlap or diverge, look into the correlation between individualist/collectivist value orientations and behaviour, and study how this parameter manifests itself in a number of cases. The study is based on philosophical, anthropological, and cultural psychological theories, including the theory of guilt and shame cultures by Ruth Benedict, the theory of self-presentation by Roy Baumeister and Debra Hutton, the theory of self-construal by Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, and the theory of cultural logics by Angela Leung and Dov Cohen. As empirical confirmation of the above theoretical approaches, this article provides real-life examples collected by the author. The relevant literature was subject to categorical analysis. Empirical data was collected and analysed using methods such as participant observation and discourse analysis. The comparative approach and hermeneutics techniques served as a general methodological prism. The study shows that, at least since the 1960s, specialists in the field of cultural studies have increasingly discovered limitations and inconsistencies in theories that previously claimed to be universal: many of the models which originated in the West do not adequately represent non-Western cultures. The study proves the workability of the parameter of individualism versus collectivism for the interpretation of behavioural inconsistencies between people of different cultures. This parameter is compatible with a wide range of frameworks and shows a clear correlation between behavioural characteristics in different cultures and allows us to interpret phenomena that were previously uninterpretable.

When formulating cross-cultural theories, researchers are forced, for obvious reasons, to resort to generalizations that allow them to identify the most characteristic manifestations of a particular unique culture. At the same time, the concept of uniqueness in modern research (most notably in the philosophy of culture) is often revealed through the concept of national culture,[2] which in the regional and cultural context is usually limited to the boundaries of national states or geographic regions. This allows us, with certain reservations, to talk about *Russian culture* (contained within a single national state) or *Arab culture* (spread over an entire geographic region), despite the internal diversity in these entities. At the same time, national cultures are not homogenous and demonstrate great internal diversity. As we know, this "unity in diversity" constitutes one of the key paradoxes of any theory of culture, when, by default, a typification of something that exists only as a singular thing is required (Philosophy of Culture… 2020: 10; Spengler 1998: 200, 368, 423, 439). This is precisely why the scientific study of culture requires, first and foremost, reliance on traceable and recorded facts, and cannot be limited to the creation of a generalizing matrix, even if it is entirely logical.

The paradox of the "unity of the heterogenous," however, does not prohibit (on the contrary, it even suggests) the transition to a comparison of the heterogenous. And if Oswald Spengler insisted on the need to pay attention to the difference in mathematics, the optics of the culture of philosophy today suggest that other foundations should be kept in mind. Among these, a special place is occupied by the axiological and ideological attitudes that exist in a particular society, as well as the behavioural rules, norms, and so on, that are associated with them (Philosophy of Culture… 2020: 94–95).

Being essentially unconscious structures, values are ambivalent and manifest themselves along several vectors that allow us to identify comparable parameters. Despite the limited applicability of quantitative approaches in cross-cultural anthropology (as its founder George P. Murdock (Murdock 2003: 20–22; Murdock, White 1969) noted), quantitative methods (in combination with qualitative methods) are still in demand today. What is more, over the past 75 years, there has been an increase in the number of significant cultural parameters that are suitable for identifying real cultural differences between modern societies (by my count, there are currently more than 80 such parameters). One of the most important of these, in my opinion, is the parameter "individualism versus collectivism," which can reasonably be extended to a wider

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[2] National cultures are typically understood as a set of ideas, value orientations, expectations, behavioural norms, and worldviews accepted by a particular society. In countries where the word "national" has a negative connotation, the term "local culture" is often used instead.

range of cultural phenomena. According to the classics of the cultural anthropology, this parameter can be considered the basis of the solidarity of communities; it is what allows us to identify their "supporting structure." At the same time, its influence on more specific manifestations in the behaviour of individual group members requires more serious study.

Our aim in this paper is to analyse several major cross-cultural theories of today, as well as to attempt to correlate the types of classifications of national characteristics they propose with the parameter "individualism versus collectivism," which can be considered a framework that determines the expression of value attitudes that are perceived as unconscious cultural patterns.

From the history of scientific theories: Who studied the parameter "individualism versus collectivism" and how, and what it led to

As we know, the pioneers of cross-cultural theory, the American anthropologists Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck, were among the first to discover the parameter "individualism versus collectivism," having published their seminal work *Variations in Value Orientations* in 1961. This was the first significant anthropological attempt to systematize the cultural differences of peoples through an analysis of values, and its authors also examined what type of relationship prevails in a given society: individualistic, partnership, or clan (Hills 2002: 4–5).

Twenty-three years later, the preeminent Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede published his celebrated work *Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values*, which delved far deeper into the "individualism versus collectivism" dimension. According to Hofstede, this dimension describes the relationship between the individual and the collective that prevails in any given society, and these relationships are directly related to existing social norms (Hofstede 2001: 209).

Hofstede's research revealed that the most individualistic countries are those in the West, primarily the ones that belong to the Anglo-Saxon cluster (the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and Canada), followed by the cultures of the countries of Central and Northern Europe, while the countries of the Global East and Global South demonstrate collectivist characteristics.[3] Hofstede classifies the states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as alternative clusters.

Later, Michael Minkov, a professor of cultural studies who has co-authored books with Hofstede, would go on to devote several works to revising and supplementing the cultural dimensions of the famous Dutch thinker's ideas. Thus, the quintessential characteristics of individualism include autonomy (people enjoy a certain freedom and can decide for themselves whether they want to follow a particular social norm),

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[3] In the logic of these expansive concepts, it would be more accurate to call them "non-Western cultures," or, in relation to Latin America, "the other West" (A. V. Shestopal).

disregard for status, and the existence of universal rights (everyone enjoys relatively equal rights and opportunities). Meanwhile, collectivism demonstrates the following characteristics: conformism (it is considered the norm to follow traditions and be subordinate to people with a higher status), the need for status or a higher social position, nepotism, and the exclusion of "outsiders" (Minkov, Sokolov, Lomakin 2023: 298–299). At the same time, Minkov offers another dimension, which is somewhat similar to Hofstede's "individualism versus collectivism": "What we have here is a cultural dimension that creates the same national configurations as Hofstede's individualism versus collectivism: the richest countries are at one extreme, the poorest ones are at the other. Nevertheless, I have chosen a new name for the dimension that we discuss here: "exclusionism versus universalism." Minkov also notes that he follows the suggestion of many cross-cultural psychologists here who believe that the terms "individualism" and "collectivism" are too broad and should be replaced by more narrowly focused words. In describing this new dimension, Minkov notes that he and Hofstede measured rather similar – although not identical – phenomena, since there is a high correlation between the dimensions of "exclusionism" and "individualism." But not extremely high, which suggests that these dimensions describe different aspects of the same broad phenomenon (Minkov 2011: 186–195).

No discussion of "individualism versus collectivism" would be complete without mentioning the significant contribution of the outstanding American researcher Harry Triandis. In his famous work, *Culture and Social Behavior,* Triandis notes that in individualistic cultures, people prioritize personal goals, even when these goals conflict with the goals of *relevant others* in their own group (such as family, tribe, work group, or compatriots). In contrast, in collectivist cultures, priority is given to the goals of the group to which the person belongs. Interestingly, Triandis reports two types of collectivist cultures: for some, interdependence and unity with the group are important – Triandis calls this collectivism horizontal; for others, service to the group is important – Triandis calls this collectivism vertical. But in both cases, according to Triandis, selfhood is determined by the individual's place in the group, which means that the in-group has a major influence on a wide range of aspects of social behaviour (Triandis 1994: 164–165).

However, much earlier, back in the middle of the 20th century, the fundamental differences between the so-called East and West were noticed by the renowned American anthropologist Ruth Benedict, who was the first to propose classifying cultures according to the deep principle underlying the behaviour of those who belong to the cultures in question. She divided national cultures into cultures of guilt, which include American culture, and cultures of shame, to which, in her opinion, Japanese culture belongs: "In anthropological studies of different cultures the distinction between those which rely heavily on shame and those that rely heavily on guilt is an important one. A society that inculcates absolute standards of morality and relies on men's developing a conscience is a guilt culture by definition […] True shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behavior, not, as true guilt cultures do, on an internalized convic-

tion of sin. Shame is a reaction to other people's criticism. A man is shamed either by being openly ridiculed and rejected or by fantasying to himself that he has been made ridiculous. In either case it is a potent sanction […] In a nation where honor means living up to one's own picture of oneself, a man may suffer from guilt though no man knows of his misdeed…" (Benedict 1989: 222–223). To be sure, while feelings of guilt and shame are related to the so-called emotions of self-awareness and imply a negative perception of oneself ("self-critical emotions") (Miceli, Castelfranchi 2018: 711), they are nevertheless caused by completely different reasons: guilt arises when a person fails to comply with internal norms, and shame arises when social norms are violated[4].

Benedict does not use the categories of "individualism" and "collectivism" in her research, but it would later become apparent that her cultures of guilt are inextricably linked to, and perhaps even generated by, an individualistic worldview, while the culture of shame is held together by the attitudes and norms of collectivism.

An analysis of cultures of shame (which include most cultures of the East – Middle and Far) clearly demonstrates that an emphasis is placed on preserving the reputation of an individual or group, sometimes by any means necessary. In such a culture, the factors that determine human behaviour are always external – outside of public opinion, outside of social rules, outside of religious precepts, outside of group attitudes. The main barometer of the actions and feelings of representatives of cultures of guilt (to which the countries of the Western world belong) are internal – knowledge of right and wrong, Kant's "moral law within us," conscience or inner god (Khalil 2018: 125).

Benedict's theory would be rethought on several occasions, and numerous important and relevant theoretical superstructures were formed based on it. For example, the classification of the cultures of guilt and shame received significant development in the formulation of the psychological processes of self-presentation, self-construction, and self-interpretation of the individual, all of which are conditioned by cultural differences.

There is reason to assume, for example, that each of the two types of self-presentation developed by Roy Baumeister and Debra Hutton may prevail in different types of cultures: the first type, which is an attempt to bring one's self-presentation into line with one's own ideal self, will be found more often in individualistic cultures of guilt, while the second type, which involves self-presentation based on the desire to meet the expectations and preferences of others, will obviously be more common among representatives of a collectivistic culture of shame (Baumeister, Hutton 1987: 71).

The famous studies of Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama in the 1990s also put forward compelling evidence that strategies for self-construction of personality are not universal, as psychologists had previously believed, but are also determined by the basic cultural parameter of "individualism versus collectivism."

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[4] Stefanenko T. G. 2009. *Ethno-Psychologists: A Textbook for University Students of Psychology.* Aspekt Press.

In their article, *Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation,* Markus and Kitayama follow Ruth Benedict by turning to the American and Japanese cultures to analyse two fundamentally different approaches to how individuals view, perceive, and interpret themselves (their selfhood), which they term the independent and interdependent approaches (Markus, Kitayama 1991: 224–225). The independent approach, as a product of the culture of individualism, is characteristic of Western countries, while the interdependent approach is widespread in collectivist societies of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and many southern European countries. In Western cultures, for example, there is the concept of the initial isolation of the individual, according to which the cultural norm dictates the need to become an independent person, to find oneself, and to realize one's unique personal qualities. Moreover, this kind of self requires an awareness of oneself as a subject whose behaviour is dictated by its own meaning, based on internal feelings, thoughts, and actions, and is not connected to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of other people. This kind of self arises from a belief in the integrity and uniqueness of the configuration of the internal attributes of each individual person[5].

The basis of the regulatory mechanisms of the psyche in collectivist cultures, on the contrary, is an orientation towards others – towards a group, or towards social or religious prescriptions, which can go as far as "guessing" the thoughts and feelings of relevant others that not only influence behaviours and reactions, but also activate the self-awareness of the individual. It is telling that studies carried out by German and American researchers clearly show that collectivism has a positive correlation with various aspects of emotional intelligence (Gunkel, Schlägel, Engle 2014).

A good illustration of the collectivist approach to others is the Japanese cultural category "wa," which signifies the ideal of social harmony, group unity, and conformity as a virtue to be strived for (Wierzbicka 1991: 353–355). While expressing agreement despite internal disagreement in individualistic cultures is seen as hypocrisy, servility, weakness, and spinelessness, in collectivist cultures such behaviour, on the contrary, deserves sincere respect, since, in the opinion of members of society, it demonstrates such qualities as tolerance, maturity, balance, flexibility, and self-control, which are encouraged by society. Within such a construal, the self becomes most meaningful and complete when it is cast in the appropriate social relationship (Markus, Kitayama 1991: 227).

Through the prism of independent and interdependent self-interpretation, Markus and Kitayama examine three important psychological processes: cognition, emotion, and motivation. For example, their study found that for those with interdependent

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[5] See Clifford Geertz: "The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural background, is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures" (Geertz 1983: 59).

selves, in contrast to those with independent selves, some aspects of knowledge representation and some of the processes involved in both social and non-social thinking are influenced by a pervasive focus on the relevant others. And the expression and experience of emotions – as well as the emergences of motives – may be significantly shaped and governed by the reactions of others. As an example, I can cite a phrase spoken to me by a colleague from Egypt, whose highly collectivist culture forms an independent personality type: *"At the end of the day, the most important thing in life is for people to love us. It is thus necessary to do everything possible to ensure that they are well disposed towards us."*

At the same time, the emotion of anger, which routinely arises in those with an independent self, will be least common among the interdependent types of self. Moreover, self-serving motivations will be replaced by motivations that appear altruistic. Another anecdotal episode is a conversation I had with an Indian businessman, whose culture clearly belongs to the interdependent type of self:

"Could you explain what exactly your personal interest in this topic is?"

"My actions are not governed by personal interest! There is no personal agenda, no hidden interests, when I discuss any topic! Please do not think so badly of me…"

While the independent self prioritizes autonomy, self-actualization, self-awareness, the development of one's potential, and the expression of one's own unique needs, rights, and opportunities, the interdependent self sees the interconnection of every single person as an absolute law: feeling interdependence, the person sees themselves as part of all-encompassing social connections and realizes that their behaviour is predetermined and depends on how successfully they are able to perceive the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others. That is, the self in this case is best realized if it is formed in the context of close social relations. Thus, the interdependent self cannot be characterized as a separate entity, since it changes its structure depending on the social context, and the central and objective thing here is not the personality, but relations with others. For the interdependent self, such personality attributes as abilities, preferences, opinions, judgements, and behavioural traits are situational, that is, they are fluid and flexible, and are therefore not classified by those with an interdependent self as determining regulators of behaviour. Accordingly, in many areas of public life, a person's opinions, abilities, and personal characteristics are of secondary importance and, as such, they must be under constant (voluntary) control and management in order to cope with the main task of interdependence – remaining in an unbreakable connection with others. Today, we can see that even the most Westernized representatives of China's highly collectivist culture tend to behave in accordance with the expectations of others and the social prescriptions of interdependence, rather than with personal preferences. I once had a conversation with an Oxford University student of Chinese descent from Singapore that serves as a perfect example of where cultural prescription and personal desires are inseparable:

"I'm thinking about my future career. I'm leaning towards finance."

"What do you want to do?"

"I want to give my mum a decent life."

"That's wonderful. But what kind of work do you think you would enjoy? What do you want to do?"

"It doesn't matter to me. The main thing is to provide for my mum."

In the case of the interdependent self,[6] people are motivated by the need to adapt to relevant others, to create and fulfil obligations to them, and to be entwined in a variety of interpersonal relationships.

Thus, it is obvious that the cultures of individualism and collectivism not only prescribe different models of reactions and behaviours to their members, but they literally "flash" human consciousness (as Hofstede famously wrote, "culture is the software of the mind"), constructing the human self/personality.

So, the initial hypothesis that different types of self-interpretation (independent versus interdependent) will differ depending on whether the person belongs to the culture of individualism or the culture of collectivism is confirmed by the fact that there is a profound correlation between the behaviour of individuals and their values that are determined by their belonging to one or another culture – in this case, the culture of shame or the culture of guilt. At the same time, the formation of self-esteem in collectivist cultures is influenced greatly by the social context, its norms and rules, whereas in individualistic cultures, an internal orientation towards culturally prescribed personal standards and moral standards prevails.

In other words, since the functioning of collectivist cultures is based on constant, close, and intensive interaction between members of that culture, the main socially desirable characteristics here are a wide range of communicative qualities that ensure the most effective communication with others and which represent a set of properties, skills, and abilities that characterize the person's attitude towards others and ensure the possibility of maintaining contact and mutual understanding between them (Vagapova, Andriyanova, Kuzmischova 2009: 2). As a result, the high prioritization of communication qualities and the clear regulation of social behaviour that is characteristic of collectivist societies give rise to a mechanism for the formation of self-esteem based on compliance with prescribed norms and the fulfilment of social obligations in relation to one's group. In individualistic cultures, where personal autonomy is a generally accepted norm, self-esteem is far less dependent on social norms and expectations and is in most cases determined by the person's own ideas about themselves.

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[6] Several alternative terms exist that can be used to describe this personality type: sociocentric, holistic, collective, collaborative, composite, contextual, connected, and relational.

Value attitudes and types of behavioural characteristics: The culture of dignity, culture of honour, and culture of face through the prism of the "individualism versus collectivism" parameter

The next significant approach to the classification of national cultures, which can be based on the same basic dimension of individualism versus collectivism, is the theory proposed by Angela Leung of Singapore Management University and Dov Cohen of the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (Leung, Cohen 2011). Leung and Cohen posit that national cultures can be classified according to different cultural logics (not to be confused with Smirnov's studies of the logics of different cultures) and developed a theory of three different types of culture based on this: cultures of dignity, cultures of honour, and cultures of face. The names of all three types are non-judgemental and to a large extent arbitrary. At the same time, Leung and Cohen emphasize that all three types exist in all national cultures, although one will prevail significantly over the others. The "individualism versus collectivism" parameter we are investigating is directly related to this classification, since we can assert that individualistic culture correlates with the culture of dignity, and the cultures of honour and face appear in collectivist cultures.

As we demonstrated above, self-esteem in an individualistic culture is primarily based on the person's personal achievements, or how well they meet their own standards and aspirations, how successful they are in achieving their personal goals. Consequently, the behaviour of representatives of such a culture is determined by their own feelings and ideas. The culture of dignity is based on the fact that each person has a unique value that is inherent to them, and that this value may not depend on the assessments or opinions of others. It is here where we can trace the most important Christian axiological attitude, postulating the ultimate significance of human free will: for example, according to Thomas Aquinas, man has free will, for if he did not, advice, instructions, orders, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain[7].

"For Christians, the concept of a willing person is a concept that allows for the possibility of a person making decisions of his own free will, that is, without reference to external circumstances […] Human actions, to the same extent as the actions of the Almighty, can be free from external influence and, what is more, only such actions can be assessed as moral or immoral" (Tsarkov 2015: 5).

Thus, the dignity of the individual does not depend on how well the person fits into the social context, how highly they are valued by the group, or how successfully they fulfil prescribed obligations towards others. The main barometer of behaviour in an individualistic culture of dignity is the individual's internal sense of self, on which

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[7] Thomas Aquinas. *Treatise on Man. Question 83. Free Will. Article 1. Whether man has free-will?* Библиотека soteria.ru. URL: https://soteria.ru/s4854/52/

he or she relies when making judgements and decisions, and when choosing behavioural models. At the same time, a person with a culture of dignity is independently responsible for their own actions, and their life in general.

In this type of culture, children are usually raised through dichotomy of "right versus wrong," which would manifest itself as the main regulator of behaviour in life. Accordingly, conformism is less prevalent in this type of culture, normative pressure produces only minor discomfort, and there is a willingness to express disagreement (Is an Emphasis… 2021: 9) in the case of psychological pressure from members of one's own group.

The fundamental values here are truth, freedom, individual rights, autonomy, and independence, since in the Western world, as social relations were secularized, the sanctity of society was replaced by the sacredness of the individual (Franck 1997: 596). The axiological potential of the culture of dignity creates what is today commonly referred to as liberal values, which include individualism, rationalism, freedom, responsibility, justice and tolerance. (Teehankee 2005: 3–4). The culture of dignity thus seeks to balance the ideals of equality (all people are equal at birth) and the ideals of freedom (the value of a person does not depend on the judgements of others) (Kim, Cohen 2010: 540).

For representatives of the second type of cultural logic – the culture of honour – self-esteem is formed primarily on the basis of a person's reputation in society, how others see them and what they think of them. Accordingly, the individual bases his or her thoughts, behavioural patterns, and reactions on building and maintaining their reputation in the eyes of others. It is generally accepted that the culture of honour dominates in the countries of southern Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Africa, India, Pakistan, Latin America, as well as the South Caucasus and the North Caucasus region of Russia.

Desirable behavioural norms during communication in a culture of honour include the following: extreme politeness, pleasant manners, frequent exchange of compliments, exaggerated praise, repetition of gratitude, avoiding criticising the interlocutor or making any statements that might cause them psychological discomfort.

A similar reverential attitude towards maintaining harmony in society was also noted by the famed philosopher and anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl during his studies of the so-called "primitive peoples": people in such societies do everything possible to refrain from starting quarrels, scandals, and other conflicts; in other words, they try to be pleasant when conversing with others. The reason for this social normativity, according to Lévy-Bruhl, lies in the cultural attitude that a person avoids discord not to be labelled as a troublemaker – a member of the community who will be considered antisocial, dangerous to society and, ultimately, the one who will be blamed for any misfortunes that this social group may encounter (Levy-Bruhl 1935: 66).

Children in these countries are taught to behave according to the dichotomy of "proper and improper." And the main barometer of an individual's behaviour will lie outside and be regulated by public opinion, social norms and attitudes. The most im-

portant value orientations here are justice (understood as a symmetrical response to the actions of others, good and bad) and religious and/or social morality.

At the same time, the reputation that a person in a given culture so desires depends on how closely he or she fulfils the social obligations prescribed by that culture and, most importantly, how fully they live up to the expectations of others. Meanwhile, a person of honour asserts and protects not only their own reputation, but also, and this is particularly important, the reputation of their group – family, clan, tribe, relatives, close friends, ethnic group, nationality, religious denomination, etc., since the reputation of the groups and the reputation of the individual are inseparable. Accordingly, society is responsible for the actions and lives of each of its members, and the loss of reputation by one member automatically damages the reputation of the group as a whole. It is not surprising that when a threat to one's reputation appears (which, as we demonstrated earlier, is the central pillar of the individual's self-esteem), this can entail a defensive reaction in the form of abrasive and sometimes aggressive behaviour. Honour can be claimed, lost, and restored.

In collectivist cultures of honour, people actively manage their own reputation, especially when it is threatened, and emotions are used as the main tool for influencing others: the ability to experience and publicly display negative emotions is not only widespread, it is encouraged. Thus, the expression of certain negative emotions signals that a person is offended, insulted, or angry, which means that he or she must be immediately calmed down or appeased. Otherwise this will threaten the integrity of the group, which is unacceptable for a collectivist mentality, where the group represents the main and unconditional value. As a result, direct insults against an individual or group are unacceptable in this culture, and if this does happen, an extremely aggressive and harsh reaction should be expected.

Classic examples of this include the reaction of representatives of the Muslim world, a culture of honour, to the publication of Salman Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses* in the United Kingdom in 1988, as well as the publication of cartoons in the French *magazine Charlie Hebdo* in 2008. The novel and cartoons, which the believers considered to be insulting Islam, triggered a chain of extremely aggressive actions, including terrorist attacks, murders, attempted murders, street protests, the pronouncement of "sentencings" by religious figures, arson attacks on bookstores, and other illegal actions aimed at defending and protecting the honour or the religious group. These manifestations clearly caused confusion, bewilderment, and righteous indignation on the part of representatives of the culture of dignity, whose orientation towards extreme tolerance, as well as the protection of individual rights and freedoms, again met an alien reaction, perceived as barbarism and savagery.

Human rights is another area where the clash of cultures of dignity and honour is evident. Despite the fact that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed by 48 of the 58 UN member states at that time, with two countries not voting at all (Yemen and Honduras) and eight abstaining (the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist

Republic, Yugoslavia, and South Africa), it soon became obvious that the declaration, which claimed to be universal, contained not a universal, but a Western understanding of human rights. More than 30 years later, in 1982, Iran's representative to the United Nations made a statement that the Declaration was a "secular understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition" that could not be implemented by Muslims because it went against Sharia law. To be sure, this concept of human rights, based on the principle of inalienable, intrinsic, individual rights inherent to all people, while at the same time emphasizing the unconditional equality of all people, is a distinctly Western construct.

If we take a closer look at the problem, it becomes clear that this approach is unacceptable for cultures of honour. Article I of the Declaration reads: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood"[8]. The question of freedom, which, as we have seen, is so important for a culture of dignity, is less so for a culture of honour, where talking about individual freedom is perceived as a vicious tendency towards egoism, effectively a betrayal of the interests of the group. Article 16 states that "Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution." These words clearly contradict Sharia law, according to which a Muslim woman may only marry a Muslim man. And their rights in this relationship are not equal. Then there is Article 18, which notes that every person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion: "this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." It is well known that apostasy (*ridda*) is one of the most serious crimes against faith in Islam and is punished severely. This is directly related to the culture of honour, where leaving the bosom of the group is seen as a betrayal of its interests and denigration of the reputation of the entire *ummah*.

The Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip, launched in response to an unprecedented attack by the Hamas group against the country in October 2023, was met in the Arab world not only with indignation, but also with numerous street rallies, in particular in the capitals of Algiers, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, and Manama. In many Muslim countries, people started to boycott products made by Western companies (McDonald's, Starbucks, KFC, Coca-Cola, Nestlé) in protest against their countries' support for Israel's policies in Palestine. Such actions, intended to demonstrate solidarity with the people of Palestine (who in this case are seen as fellow Muslims or part of the Arab nation), can without doubt be seen as a response by representatives of a culture of honour to a threat to their group (religious, ethnic, or cultural).

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[8] Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted by Resolution 217 A (III) of the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948. United Nations. URL: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights?ysclid=m bftmy39du163845038

It is important to point out that the practice of honour killings– the murder of a close relative, usually a woman, for bringing shame on the family or clan, or dishonouring the reputation of an entire group – while inherent to this culture, is marginal. Dishonour in this case is usually understood as actions of a sexual nature that are forbidden in a given culture: adultery, premarital relations, and so on (Dianina 2015: 69). Since the culture of honour is often highly patriarchal, the behaviour of women is regulated by strict social norms that imply that the man is the head of, and thus controls, the family. What is more, the man's honour in this type of culture correlates directly with the reputations of the women of his family, since he is the one responsible for their behaviour and moral character. In extreme cases of a violation of the norms of behaviour prescribed to women, her male relatives are obliged to wash away the shame from the clan with blood.

In the modern public consciousness, honour killings are usually associated with Islam, But the fact is that the Muslim doctrine explicitly and categorically prohibits such actions, and special theological decisions (*fatwa*) define honour killings as a grave sin[9]. Furthermore, honour killings often occur in other honour cultures that are not Muslim, for example the Hindu (D'Lima, Solotaroff, Pande) or Christian cultures[10]. It can thus be said that the practice of honour killings is not religious, but cultural.

The intensive Westernization that has taken place over the past several decades has heavily influenced the societies of a large number of Eastern countries whose way of life was traditionally based on the values of honour cultures, pushing the norms and attitudes of dignity cultures onto them. Look at modern Egyptian society, for example, which, like many other societies in the Arab world, has long been subject to multiple influences from Western schools and teachings. An example of the clash between the Egyptian culture of honour and the Western culture of dignity is the work of psychologists in Cairo, who rely on such classical concepts of Western psychoanalysis as separation and personal boundaries. Let us note that one of the first professional requests for cross-cultural research came from American psychiatrists and psychologists who encountered dead-end situations in counselling when the psychological models they were accustomed to using did not produce the desired results when working with non-Western patients.

As we know, separation in psychology is typically understood as the process of psychological separation of a child from his or her parents, which, according to the values and attitudes of the culture of dignity, is a necessary condition for a healthy human life. As the Russian psychologist Marina Rybnikova notes, "Whether separation happens sooner or later depends on many factors. For example, on the conditions in which the child currently finds himself. If hyper-protection, hyper-control, manipula-

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[9] Fatwa: Honour Killing is Disbelief (kufr). *Islamnews*. 13.07.2016. URL: https://islamnews.ru/fetva-ubijstvo-chesti-neverie-kufr (In Russian)

[10] Greek women confront macho culture fuelling femicides. *France24*. 19.04.2022. URL: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220419-greek-women-confront-macho-culture-fuelling-femicides

tion, guilt, and shame are typical in the family, then it is unlikely that separation will take place in proper time and painlessly for everyone. If the parents respect the child's selfhood, his or her opinions and decisions, there should be no problems with separation." This approach largely runs counter to the basic principles of the Egyptian – and, more broadly, Arab – culture of honour: what appears to a Russian specialist as hyper-protection and hyper-control would be understood in this culture as the natural care and control of a group (in this case, a family) over an individual, as prescribed by cultural norms. At the same time, such psychological techniques as constantly praising the interlocutor, which is a socially expected and natural communicative practice in Arab culture, may appear to be reprehensible manipulative behaviour in the context of Western culture. The American clinical psychologist Leon Seltzer, for example, notes that there is a dark side to praise: "Much more than we typically realize, it can constitute a kind of verbal bribery, offered primarily to serve the interest of the person offering it[11]". Regularly appealing to guilt and shame when raising a child is a well-established parenting technique in most collectivist cultures, while in individualistic cultures this approach is rarely used and is often frowned upon. What is more, one of the conditions for successful separation is the refusal to idealize one's parents (for example, the patient is asked to make a list of imperfections of each parent); Egyptian culture, meanwhile, unconditionally prescribes the idealization of the parents as an integral part of moral behaviour, as well as unconditional love and respect for them (including under the significant influence of Islamic axiomatics): "Whoever obeys the command of Allah concerning the parents, two doors from paradise will be opened to him, and if he obeys Allah's command about one of them one door will be opened. And whoever disobeys the command of Allah concerning the parents, two doors from hell will be opened to him."[12] What is more, the Egyptian culture of honour, which is very much based on the clan and extreme collectivism, sees separation from the parents as an extremely dangerous strategy capable of destabilizing the entire social system.

The concept of personal boundaries is also often perceived by those with more traditional attitudes in Egypt as an attempt to break close social ties, to put oneself in opposition to the group, which carries the threat of ostracism, excommunication from the group. And this, in turn, is seen as social death.

The third type of culture, according to the classification of Leung and Cohen, is the culture of face. Just like the culture of honour, this type of culture is collectivist, but it also has a number of its own distinctive features. It should be noted that the concept of "face" is central to Asian culture as a whole and, at the same time, one of the most controversial topics in research. As Prosekov correctly points out, authors who study the concept of "face" are divided into those who believe that it is inherent to Chinese

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[11] Seltzer L. 2014. Praise as Manipulation: 6 Reasons to Question Compliments. *Psychology Today*. 08.01.2014. URL: https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/evolution-of-the-self/201401/praise-as-manipulation-6-reasons-to-question-compliments

[12] 9 Hadiths that Will Make You Rethink Your Attitude Towards Your Parents. *Islam-Today*. 14.02.2017. URL: https://islam-today.ru/veroucenie/10-haisov-kotorie-zastavyat-vas-peresmotret-svoye-otnoshenie-k-roditelyam/

and Asian culture only, and those who believe that European culture has its fair share of analogues to the Asian "face." This work, based on extensive anthropological and psychological research, proceeds from the premise that it is impossible to establish a sufficient correlation between the concepts of "face" in Asian and European cultures. Linguists are also hesitant to say that such a correlation exists. The expression "to lose face" in the English-language tradition, for example, has a fairly unambiguous connotation: to do something so that people stop respecting you[13]; to lose other people's respect[14]; or do something which makes you seem weak, stupid etc., and which makes people respect you less[15]. The Russian understanding of the expression, as defined by the *Large Phraseological Dictionary of the Russian Language*, is somewhat different: "To behave in an unworthy manner; to demonstrate one's weakness, incompetence, or inability to do something."[16] The Chinese understanding of "face" – the central concept of Asian ethics – is completely different: the face is the sum total of the individual's social claims as recognized by society (Malyavin 2007: 11), "the face is 'represented by signs,' the unifying semantic core of which is 'social status,' 'a person's compliance with the norms of social behaviour,' 'the external side that demonstrates this compliance[17]'". Thus, the concept of a person who is valued above any earthly belongings (Yutang 2010: 191) means the totality of a person's social status, their ability to correspond to the clearly prescribed norms of this status, and society's assessment of the extent to which a person lives up to them. Thus, in Western cultures, "face" is, as a rule, associated with individual manifestations of personality, while in Asian cultures (which includes the people of Southeast Asia and the Far East: China, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, etc.) it is exclusively to do with the social status of the individual. The importance of the group in this type of culture is absolute, which is clearly seen in the example of how in conversation Japanese people, instead of using the usual "I" use a plural pronoun with reference to the place of residence or belonging to a group.[18]

Thus, the self-esteem of the individual in cultures of face is based on the acquisition and preservation of face, which presupposes the masterly integration of the individual into the social context, acting in accordance both with his or her clearly defined social role in a stable, sustainable, and rigid hierarchical system, and with social

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[13] Definition of lose/save face from the Cambridge Learner's Dictionary. *Cambridge Free English Dictionary and. Thesaurus.* URL: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/learner-english/lose-save-face?q=lose+face

[14] lose Idiom. *Merriam-Webster Dictionary.* URL: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/lose%20face

[15] lose face Idiom. *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English.* URL: https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/lose-face

[16] "To lose face." *Large Phraseological Dictionary of the Russian Language. Definition. Usage. Culturological Commentary.* 2006. AST Press. URL: https://rus-phrase-dict.slovaronline.com/1549-D0%9F%D0%9E%D0%A2%D0% 95%D0%A0%D0%AF%D0%A2%D0%AC%20%D0%9B%D0%98%D0%A6%D0%9E

[17] Nagibina I. G. 2017. Formation of the Discursive-Communicative Paradigm in Chinese Linguistics: From Theory to Social Practice. Doctoral dissertation: 10.02.19. P. 105.

[18] Kornilov M. N. 1996. Japanese Society and Personality in Cultural Comparative Studies: Comparison with China and the West. 1. Matsumoto D., Kudo TSUTOMU. *Nihonjin no kanjo sekai.* Seishin Shobo; Hsu, F. L. K. 1985). The self in cross-cultural perspective. In Marsella A. J. (Ed.). *Culture and Self: Asian and Western Perspectives.* P. 24–56. Tavistock Publications. The Afro-Asiatic World: Problems of Civilizational Analysis: Issue 2. Regional Civilizations. P. 109.

expectations that are strictly regulated by the normative culture and have no expiry date. Japanese people, for example, are extremely sensitive to other people's reactions to their behaviour, take their opinions and assessments to heart, and are always concerned about what people think of them and whether the people around them understand their behaviour correctly.

This is why the main barometer of behaviour in cultures of face is social norms and regulations designed to provide all members of the group with what is considered the main value in life – social harmony.

Face-saving strategies depend on the individual's status in a social hierarchical group, be it a family or an organization. People of lower social status save face by diligently fulfilling their duties and obeying those of a higher social status. People of higher social status save face by taking responsibility for people of lower social status and thus demonstrating a paternalistic attitude towards them. Interestingly, face can be lost, taken away, or given to others, but the main thing is that any actions with an individual's face always depend on others. Children in cultures of face, as in cultures of honour, are raised within the framework of the dichotomy of "proper and improper."

The logic of cultures of face dictates the need to maintain harmony within one's own group as a priority, which seems to be a far more important task than concern about the reputation of an individual or group in the eyes of others (as is the case in cultures of honour). In this regard, the main personal qualities are modesty, conformism, self-control, and restraint.

Cultures of face typically have an abundance of rules of behaviour that contribute to gaining or maintaining face, including refraining from being too truthful, gratefully accepting unnecessary gifts, showing agreement when you really do not agree, trying not to show negative emotions, showing praise, giving presents, frequently apologizing, demonstrating submission, and humility. The threat of losing face can often lead to self-abasement, when the speaker will deliberately humiliate himself in order to demonstrate respect for the person they are talking to ("The Chinese value modesty very highly). (Huang 2022: 178–179).

A comparison of the concept of face in the two major cultures of East Asia – China and Japan – reveals some differences. Thus, the main mechanism regulating life in China from the time of Confucius to the present day is observance of the external ritual, that is, the place in the hierarchy and behaviour of each member of the group is dictated by clearly defined rules ("external restrictions"). Meanwhile, in Japan, the life of society is regulated by the internal self-control of its members, a moral foundation based on a sense of shame in front of one's group ("internal restrictions")[19]. At the same time, the understanding of what constitutes one's "group" differs in the two cultures:

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[19] Kotove R. I. (n.d.) Japan and Chine in the Comparative Cultural Studies of Chinese Scholars. In , *Japan in Comparative Socio-Cultural Studies* (Collection of abstracts). URL: http://national-mentalities.ru/east/vostochnaya_i_yugovostochnaya_aziya/yaponiya_v_sravnitelnyh_sociokulturnyh_issledovaniyah_referativnyj_sbornik/yaponiya_i_kitaj_v_kulturnokomparativistskih_issledovaniyah_kitajskih_uchenyh/

in China, family and the clan always come first, and the hierarchical subordination to people older than you acts as a supporting social structure; in Japan, this role is played by various non-related groups (university, corporate, sports, district, etc.), loyalty to which is an unconditional and obligatory virtue. Finally, the reasons for losing face can also vary from one culture to another: reasons for losing facing in China include the lack of such qualities as generosity and "broadness of soul," whereas in Japan, one can lose as a result of their arrogance, frivolity (Conrad 2019: 183), or infidelity.

The concept of face in the other countries of the region also has its own specifics. In Thailand, for example, qualities such as politeness, attentiveness, harmlessness, and unobtrusiveness contribute to saving face. In Vietnam, the same role is played by self-respect, pride, and dignity.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can say that the theories of cross-cultural interaction considered in this paper – the theory of guilt and shame cultures by Ruth Benedict, the theory of self-presentation by Roy Baumeister and Debra Hutton, the theory of self-construal by Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, and the theory of cultural logics by Angela Leung and Dov Cohen – are open to the implicit integration of such a framework parameter for assessing national cultures as "individualism versus collectivism." Using this framework, we can divide different cultures into cultures of guilt, cultures of shame, and cultures of face depending on regional characteristics that impose shades of interpretation on the reading of the specifics of national (local) cultures. In doing this, the unique nature of behavioural practices is demonstrated, depending on the localization of the framework parameter. At the same time, the reverse process also appears to be true: the scaling of local characteristics highlights unique behavioural patterns within the common framework of "individualism versus collectivism." The study of specific cases, primarily those related to goal setting, reveals the suitability of this framework for studying wildly different cultures (broadly speaking, Western and non-Western countries). Thus, this theory demonstrates a high degree of hybridization of theoretical and cultural foundations – and the sources of this hybridization clearly require further research. At the same time, it would be an unjustified extrapolation at the current stage to claim that the proposed optics are universal, primarily because they too are part of the picture of the world, which stems from the values that the scientific culture of the Western world is based upon.

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