

Interaction of Cultural and Language Competencies in the Development of Non-Native Speech Skills in Educational Discourse¹

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Abstract. The article aims to analyse the cognitive aspect of educational discourse conducted in a non-native language, specifically the effect of cultural competence on linguistic competence in the process of speech generation. The author considers the problem of transmitting knowledge about the world by means of language from generation to generation in the mental and linguistic ontogenesis. In contrast to the prevailing opinion, the author proves that language itself does not contain information accumulated within linguoculture, but only facilitates the transfer of cultural information that is not derived from language. It is drawn from other sources: innate cognitive programs, patterns of behaviour, reactions to external stimuli, mental strategies, directly from the surrounding extralinguistic reality through senses, etc. The author also describes the means and methods of fixing cultural knowledge in language structure. The research is based on English and Russian language material.

Keywords: the cumulative function of language, speech ontogenesis, the semantic structure of words, lexical notion, mental model, cognitive programme, common experience

As L.N. Beilinson correctly points out, professional discourse is the “communication of specialists among themselves or with those who come to them for advice or professional assistance” (Beilinson 2009: 145). Among the numerous definitions of professional discourse in line with our research, this one is particularly relevant, since it implies that at the other side of such discourse are non-professionals (clients) or future professionals (students). It thus follows that educational discourse can be qualified as one of the types of professional discourse. This also applies to the discourse that develops in the course of learning and becoming proficient in a foreign language. In this case, we are talking about communication in a non-native language in a classroom setting.

¹ English translation from the Russian text: Savitskaya E.V. 2020. Vzaimodejstvie kul'turnoj i jazykovoj kompetencij pri osvoenii navykov nerodnoj rechi v uchebnom diskurse. *Discurs Professional'noi Kommunikatsii* [Professional Discourse & Communication]. 2(1). P. 59-71. <https://doi.org/10.24833/2687-0126-2020-2-1-59-71>.

In the linguistic and didactic culture, various aspects of educational discourse using a non-native language have been covered widely. However, some aspects have received less attention than others. Among them is the problem of mastering the skills of non-native speech, as close as possible to the authentic speech of native speakers. Yet it is precisely these skills that are in demand due to the need to deepen cross-cultural understanding in order to expand and strengthen peaceful cooperation between countries and ease international tensions.

In order to communicate in a non-native language at an almost native-speaker level, it is necessary to master that language in close and inseparable connection with the culture of the country where that language is spoken. Only then will students be able to experience what Wilhelm von Humboldt called the spirit of the people; only then will they be able to appreciate the key values of these people and get a clear idea of their attitudes and cultural preferences. "We can never fully understand the language of another people, notes Robert Lado, until we learn to see this language through the eyes of those whom these people see as their national heroes ... until we understand what these people fought for and what they are willing to fight for again, what achievements they praise and what they consider virtuous, a matter of honour, worthy of praise" (Tomakin 1980: 85).

Foreign cultural competence significantly affects foreign language competence and contributes to the production of speech that not only meets the requirements of the non-native language system, but also conforms to its norms and the rules of its usage. For example, a familiarity with the modern cultural phenomenon of political correctness allows us, when constructing speech in English, to (1) choose the correct language features, (2) combine them, (3) correlate them with the given speech situation, and (4) observe their normative frequency in speech. This is essentially the parameters of the idioethnism (national identity) of speech, which underlies its authenticity².

The production of non-native speech with idioethnism that is close to authentic speech requires students to become familiar with how language (or, more precisely, linguistic culture) accumulates, stores and transmits the historical experience and knowledge of the world acquired by the people, as well as the forms in which language (linguistic culture) reflects the ethnic picture of the world, from generation to generation. This familiarization is part and parcel of the foreign cultural competence of students, and without it they will never be able to fully master the language they are studying. Let us take a look at these issues.

² For more on idioethnism, see: Shchennikova N.V. *Strukturno-semanticheskiye i funktsionalniye kharakteristiki russkogo idioma angliyskogo yazyka* [Structural, semantic and functional characteristics of Russian idiom of the English language]. (Abstract of the Doctoral thesis). Samara State Socio-Pedagogical University, Samara, Russia. P. 74-92. (In Russian).

Linguistic means of preserving knowledge

It is well known that the cumulative function of language (from the Latin *cumulāre*, meaning to “accumulate”) plays an important role in the formation of a linguo-cultural space and in human communication. This term is generally understood as the “fixing and preservation in linguistic units of information about the reality perceived by a person (Vereshchagin and Kostomarov 1980: 7). At the same time, it is typically noted that “language in this function acts as a link between generations, a repository and a means of transferring non-linguistic collective experience” (Chistyukhin 2014: 108). Misunderstandings occasionally occur in the discussion of this issue. The ways in which perceptions of reality are preserved and transmitted from generation to generation with the help of ethnic language are not always clear.

The cumulative function is also defined as “the accumulation and preservation of the information in the vocabulary of the language and in texts” (Zherebilo 2010). However, texts are speech products, not linguistic units. Therefore, we believe that the accumulation and preservation of information in texts is a cumulative function not of language, but rather of speech. In line with our research, it is important, first of all, to accumulate and preserve information in the language system. In the linguistic literature, the cumulative function is sometimes mentioned in name only, with no indication of **how** it is executed by language. Below is a list of means and methods of its implementation.

First, the cumulative function is most directly evident in **proverbs**. This method of transferring knowledge is described in more detail by other researchers. Proverbs contain collective experience that has been passed down through generations. For example, the proverb *Hoist sail while the wind is fair* contains the worldly advice to take advantage of favourable circumstances while they are there. A nationally specific image is used to help convey the advice: Great Britain is a nation of sailors. Such prescriptions and nuggets of advice are part of the treasury of the everyday experience of the people and serve as a kind of “Ariadne’s thread” for representative of the linguistic culture.

Second, value attitudes to the phenomena of life surrounding us are indirectly expressed in **fixed phrases** (another channel for the transmission of cultural information that has been widely researched). For example, analysing a situation described by the phrase *put the cat near the goldfish bowl* and predicting its likely outcome, would lead one to the conclusion that it is foolish to trust a potential customer with an object of value, especially a sly one. Fixed phrases also preserve and transmit common wisdoms, although the advice contained within them is not always obvious.

Third, semantic units formed by the language community in the development of ethno-culture and termed lexical concepts (Vereshchagin and Kostomarov 1980: 7) are fixed in the **lexical meanings of words** and assimilated by new generations of native speakers in the ontogenesis of speech and denotations. For example, Anglo-Saxons are taught the noun *jealousy* at a young age as a combination (or totality) of its subject-logical and connotative aspects. They internalize and comprehend the cultural

phenomenon it describes and subsequently develop an attitude towards the word that is inexorably linked to English culture, with the help of the English language. This is in stark contrast to those peoples (for example, the Mosuo in Tibet) in whose cultures jealousy does not exist, and whose languages do not contain a word that would represent this phenomenon (Gracheva 2016: 125–148).

As a product of sociocultural factors, people acquire value attitudes to phenomena in ontogenesis that are prescribed to them by society (Khorin 2016: 181–186). In our example, they experience jealousy only if such an emotion exists in their socio-culture. Personality is programmed by society and culture, and this includes its emotional manifestations. Ethnic language acts as a means of programming (it is the code).

Fourth, the essence of denotation is fixed in the **internal form** of language units, and its meaning is passed on to new generations. For example, the internal form of the word *self-consciousness* contains the collective idea, taken from psychology, about shyness as a consequence of excessive self-reflection (this idea is confirmed by science; see Zimbardo 2005). Sometimes the internal form of linguistic units performs a cumulative function not at the level of individual lexical units, but at the level of entire lexical fields. For example the English lexical field “daily cycle” acts as a complex internal form for the thematic sphere of “life cycle”:

the (happy) morn of life
the dawn of life
the pre-noon of life
high noon of life
the afternoon of life
the dusk of life
the evening of life
the eve of the eternal night

The same function – designating the periods of a person’s by reference to their age – is performed by the internal form of the lexical field “seasons”:

the spring of life
springal
spring maid
the summertide of life/age
no spring chicken
in the autumn of one’s life
autumnal years
the winter of life

The thematic areas “daily/annual/life cycle” are characterized by homomorphic similarity, which allows them to model each other. A person’s life is likened to a day and a year, and a day and a year are, in turn, likened to the ability to be born and die:

At the crack of dawn A new day is born ³	The golden day is dying Beyond the purple hill, And when the wood is dark, The nightingale will sing ⁴	The old year dies, the new is born; Grant, Lord, in us as well, The old and sinful self may die, The new thy praises swell ⁵
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Fifth, the connection of lexical concepts can be traced in the **semantic structures of words**. In particular, according to the dictionary, the semantic structure of the English verb *to challenge* contains a complex of lexical meanings:

- to summon or invite defiantly to a contest or any trial of daring or skill
- to compete
- to dispute
- to call out
- to analyse, criticize
- to demand
- to call into question
- to object or take exception to
- to ask for a password or identity document
- to contradict
- to doubt

Anglo-Saxons feels such a close connection between the above lexical concepts that they place them in the semantic structure of the same lexeme, while Russians came up with the idea of establishing semantic parallels between such concepts as *doubt/call into question* or, say, *call out/deny*. These concepts are transmitted using different Russian lexemes that are not even included in the same lexical field. This example demonstrates how different ethnic groups categorize and articulate reality in different ways – and this difference is fixed in languages, passed down through generations and assimilated in the ontogenesis of speech. As a result, different ethnic groups see the world differently.

Sixth, the mental model of denotation is sometimes implicitly contained in the spectrum of its **co-occurrence**. Historical continuity and the structural parallelism of practical and mental activity have led to consciousness establishing the essence of abstract thought through a material image that is homomorphic to it. No matter how strongly abstract concepts and material things may differ ontologically, they are nevertheless homomorphic, and our cognizing consciousness uses this fact.

³ Krishnan M. 2018. A New Day is Born [Online]. URL: <http://www.childplanet.com/engpoems/meera2.htm> (accessed October 26, 2019).

⁴ Wood R.D. 2006. The Golden Day is Dying [Online]. YouTube. URL: <https://www.Youtube.com/watch?v=aggGAqFh4XA> (accessed November 15, 2019).

⁵ Marvin F.R. 1906. The New Year: A Hymn [Online]. *Carols of Hope: A Compilation of Select Sacred Songs for Use in Sunday Schools*. Boston, Massachusetts: Advent Christian Publication Society. URL: https://hymnary.org/text/the_old_year_dies (accessed November 15, 2019).

“You tend toward abstraction,” wrote Stanisław Lem, “without being able to part with the palpable, firsthand experience. Therefore a lecture unsupported by strong sensuality, full of formulas telling more about stone than a stone glimpsed, licked, and fingered will tell you – such a lecture will [...] leave a certain unsatisfied need; in the course of constructing abstract proofs, [people] feel an immense need for the support of things tangible (Lem 2010: 142).

As an example, let us look at some English phrases that use the word *hope*:

give/get hope
cherish/nurture hope
lose hope
lose/abandon/give up/defer hope
retrieve hope
to be full of hope
hold on/cling to hope
gleam/ray of hope
to be faithful to one's hope
betray hope
blight/dash hope
true hope
false hope
sweet hope
forlorn/deserted hope
bright/white hope
faint/strong hope
feeble/firm hope
small/great hope

These examples demonstrate that, in a number of collocations, the idea of *hope* can be presented as something bright, light, or radiant; something valuable; something material that can be given, acquired, kept, held, nurtured and fostered; something that can be lost or rejected, found again, destroyed, and restored; something that can change in size, strength and might; and something that can be real or fake. The word combinations presented above create the image of *hope* as something similar to a **treasure**. This emphasizes the high existential value of hope and its positive assessment in the English linguistic culture.

The word compatibility model contains a model for referring to a given object that is reflected in the collective consciousness. Unlike the explicit internal form of a word, that is, a form clearly expressed by its morphemic composition and word-formation structure, the internal form of a word, identified from the spectrum of word compatibility, is implicit in nature.

Seventh, languages contain a semantic grid that is superimposed on the world. This specific mental division of the world into fragments is acquired in the process of

developing the ability to talk and communicate by every new generation. For example, in the English linguistic culture, the day is divided into the following parts: *morning* (from midnight to noon); *afternoon* (from noon to around 6pm); and *evening* (from around 6pm to midnight). In addition, a two-part division of the day is superimposed on top of this three-part scheme: *day* (the light part of the 24-hour cycle); and *night* (the dark part of the 24-hour cycle). This “two-storey” semantic grid that has been superimposed on the day is incongruent with the Russian “single-storey” grid: *utro* (“morning,” from dawn to 11am); *den* (“day,” from 11am to dusk); and *vecher* (“evening,” from dusk until around 11pm); and *noch* (“night,” from 11pm to dawn):

English

one / six in the morning

one / six in the afternoon

tonight

Russian Equivalent

one o'clock at night / six in the morning

one o'clock in the day / six in the evening

this evening / tonight

As you can see, the lexeme *morning* is used by Anglo-Saxons to denote the part of the day that Russians call *noch* and *utro*, while *night* describes the part of the day that Russians call *vecher* and *noch*. Thus, there is no one-to-one correspondence between the English and Russian words here: *morning* does not always mean *utro*, and *night* does not always mean *noch*. This confirms the well-known theory that “Linguistic categories are not simply a consequence of some predefined structure in the world [...] Reality is divided up into arbitrary categories by every language” (Chandler 2017: 27).

When it is said that in the ontogeny of speech the child acquires knowledge about the world through language, the question naturally arises: How, by becoming acquainted with linguistic structures, does the child acquire information about extralinguistic reality?

There is an answer to this question. It is simple, but rarely discussed in the scientific literature. De facto, the child derives knowledge about extralinguistic reality not **from** ethno-language, but together with it – in a complex made up of culture and language called linguoculture.

In the ontogenesis of his or her cognitive and speech development, the child acquires information through different channels and from different sources, and links this information with linguistic units.

1) During his or her prenatal development, the child genetically inherits a number of cognitive programmes, models and patterns of behaviour, responses to external stimuli, and cognitive strategies.

2) After birth, the child receives information directly from the environment through the senses (using, according to I.P. Pavlov, the “first-signal system”).

3) The child also receives information through ostensive definitions that he or she associates with the language units being learned in parallel. Thus, language units

are filled with content within the framework of the emerging linguistic and cultural competence of the child.

4) In addition, the child starts to grasp the laws of the world through the behaviour of those around him or her, which he or she observes and connects to the linguistic units that have been acquired.

5) Later, as the vocabulary is formed, the child acquires knowledge through verbal interpretations provided by adults and establishes connections with linguistic units, semanticizing them within the framework of his or her cultural competence.

6) At a later age, the child's vocabulary expands through the use of dictionaries, teaching aids, various kinds of reference books, etc. Information reaches him or her in verbal and non-verbal visual and auditory form.

Linguistic units acquire meanings in the cognitive world of the child in the course of mastering the natural and cultural extralinguistic reality.

We can thus conclude – and this is not in line with the popular belief – that the child extracts information about reality **not** from verbal language itself, but from the linguoculture in which he or she is located. By assimilating the culture, the subject fills the units and forms of the language with content. These conclusions are in line with the results obtained by a number of researchers outside Russia (see, for example: Chater, Morten 2018)⁶.

Contrary to the traditional concept of the cumulative function of language, we believe that language itself is **not** a source of knowledge; it merely formalizes this knowledge in an ethno-specific way. Thus, in the educational process, it is the linguistic culture – its verbal and non-verbal aspects – that should be developed, rather than the foreign language as such. Only this way will students be able to fill their minds with real content of the language being studied in all its ethnic specificity.

Creating a picture of the world through language

Inextricably linked with the problem of the cumulative and modeling functions of language is the problem of our picture of the world. The concept of “picture of the world” originated in physics at the turn of the 20th century as a result of the crisis of former scientific models of the structure of the universe. The need to replace these models forced researchers to realize that they were not dealing with objective reality, but rather with a model that they themselves had developed. It is through this prism that consciousness comprehends the word around it. Theoretically, there can be many models of the world, each being merely a slice of the surrounding reality.

⁶ See also: Bainbridge C. 2022. How Do Children Learn Language? [Online Source]. *VeryWellFamily*. URL: <https://www.verywellfamily.com/how-do-children-learn-language-1449116> (accessed December 2, 2022);

Hardach S. 2018. What is the Best Age to Learn a Language? [Online Source]. *BBC Future*. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20181024-the-best-age-to-learn-a-foreign-language> (accessed November 12, 2019).

According to Heinrich Hertz, our picture of the world is “a set of internal images of external objects, from which we can logically obtain information about the behaviour of these objects. We form for ourselves images or symbols of external objects; and the form which we give them is such that the necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the images of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured” (Hertz 1973: 208). This interpretation conveys the idea that analysing the image of an object should provide information about it. The ability to do this is the most important element of the model. When talking about picture of the world, Hertz was actually referring to the model of the world.

Our picture of the world is made up of numerous sensory images (signs of the first-signal system) that penetrate the human mind through the channels of perception. However, unlike animals, people “add” sensory impressions with their minds to deduce cause-and-effect and other relationships between sensory images, endowing them with human meaning, systematizing and categorizing the world around them, finding the essence of phenomena.

Many scientists call the **real** (as opposed to the conceptual) picture of the world as the initial one. “The real picture of the world is an objective, non-human given – the surrounding world. The cultural (conceptual) picture of the world is a reflection of the real picture through the prism of concepts formed on the basis of a person’s ideas, which are received with the help of the senses and transmitted through the consciousness, both collective and individual (Ter-Minasova 2000: 41).

We believe that there is a contradiction in these definitions. Saying that the picture of the world is the world itself is like saying a portrait of a person is the person himself. A picture is, by definition, a representation of an object, not an object as such. A picture is **not** an “objective, non-human given,” it is characterized by the subjectivity that is inherent in human beings.

As for the **conceptual** picture of the world, we need to distinguish between the picture that is created by scientific concepts and the picture that is formed by everyday (ordinary) concepts. These are two extremely different pictures.

Let us also note that, according to the well-known proposition from linguoculturology, the cultural picture of the world does not consist of concepts as such, but of linguo-cultural concepts, which differ from the other concepts in a number of important ways. Thus, the cultural picture of the world has little in common with the conceptual picture of the world.

The differences in approaches to this problem, and in the methodological guidelines, have led to some inconsistency in the understanding of certain terms related to the picture of the world. Some scholars see no distinction between cultural and conceptual pictures of the world; others equate the cultural picture of the world with the value picture of the world; still others believe that the cultural picture of the world belongs to the realm of mythology and art.

There is still no consensus on what the **cognitive** picture of the world should be called. Any picture of the world necessarily reflects a comprehension of reality. The

question of what the **linguistic** picture of the world is thus remains open. According to E.S. Kubryakova, it is “the part of a person’s conceptual world that is tied to language and refracted through linguistic forms” (Kubryakova 2003: 3). However, it is difficult to imagine any part of the conceptual picture of the world that is not connected with language (some sensory images that cannot be put into words come to mind, namely words that represent concepts, but they do not form an essential part of the conceptual picture of the world).

It is unclear from the quotation what exactly the author means when she uses the words “*tied to language*” and “*refracted through linguistic forms*.” I presume she is referring to modelling concepts in the internal form of linguistic units. For example, the internal form of *squirrel bread* to refer to the boletus mushroom, or “monkfish” in the internal form of the English word *sea-devil* to refer to the fish *lophius piscatorius*.

This was precisely what G.A. Brutyan believed, noting that, “In the complex process of modeling objective reality, there are two pictures of this reality in the mind of the nominator – a conceptual (logical) picture and a verbal (linguistic) picture” (Brutyan 1972: 235). But if we separate these pictures, we will be forced to conclude that the linguistic picture of the world is contained in the internal form of the language only, and not in the system of its lexical meanings.

Take, for example, the English term *black hole* from astrophysics. The actual meaning of a *supermassive cosmic object* will need to be attributed to the logical picture of the world, while its internal form, *black hole*, will have to be attributed to the linguistic picture of the world. Given the dense metaphorical richness of the internal form of the language, which violates logic and common sense and contradicts the reasonable categorization and division of the world, we have to admit that the linguistic picture of the world is to a large extent fantastic. Accordingly, it does not correspond to reality and cannot orient people within this reality. Such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the real facts.

In our opinion, the linguistic picture of the world is contained not only in the internal form of the language, but also in meanings which contain everyday, rather than theoretical, concepts.

The conceptual system is formed on the basis of social experience, which people acquire through historical development in specific natural and cultural circumstances. As these circumstances differ, so too do the systems of concepts.

If our goal is **not** to compare heterogenous categories, but to uncover a single logical basis, then the scientific picture of the world, which is made up of theoretical concepts and anchored to specific systems of terms, should be placed in opposition to the naïve picture of the world, which is formed from eidetic (everyday) concepts and anchored to everyday language. But if we are nevertheless to use the term “linguistic picture of the world,” which is well established in scientific use, then it should be conceptualized with due account of these factors and given a definition.

In the minds of the representatives of a given linguoculture, information acquired in educational institutions is intertwined with information acquired in the ontogenesis

of speech, and in the course of personal development in general, along with the native language and background knowledge. As a result of this intertwinement, many words develop a measure of ambiguity, where one meaning refers to the common language and other meaning refers to the scientific language. To illustrate this, let us look at the meanings of the English *common salt*: 1) a white crystalline substance used for seasoning or preserving food; 2) a chemical compound NaCl formed from reaction of hydrochloric acid HCl with sodium hydroxide NaOH.

Thus, we see the coexistence of practical (everyday) and scientific (theoretical) ideas about *common salt*. In this definition, the meanings are not distributed among different words, but are combined in the semantics of the same name, *common salt*, and in the linguistic consciousness of modern adult native speakers of English. In fact, they have been combined to such an extent that several dictionaries have consolidated them into a single meaning: “a crystalline compound, sodium chloride, is abundant in nature, and is used especially to season or preserve food.”

The immediate meaning of a word reflects the primary collective idea about an object, based directly on sensory perception, while the more distant meaning reflects the result of the subsequent cognitive process.

The consciousness of a modern civilized person is characterized by a cognitive split. For example, in a domestic setting, the subject may perceive stars in much the same way as his or her distant ancestors did; but in a scientific setting, he or she may perceive them in the way that he or she was taught in physics and astronomy class at school. And these very different conceptualizations coexist harmoniously in the person's mind. The subject is aware of the conventionality of his or her everyday view of things, but in everyday life it is more convenient to be guided by an ordinary, rather than a scientific, understanding of them. There is no contradiction between the naïve and scientific pictures of the world in the person's mind. In fact, the two complement each other, as they are located at the phenomenal and noumenal levels of comprehension. Moving towards truth, science replaces traditional ideas about the world with newer, more adequate ones.

In a number of cases, the old and new representations correspond to one another. For example, people in Britain were initially only familiar with the external signs of the disease they called *jaundice* (from the French *jaune*, meaning “yellow”), that is, with the yellowing of the whites of the eyes and the skin. However, scientific research later made it possible for the inner essence of this disease to be established, namely, an inflamed liver. People increasingly started to refer to the disease using the word *hepatitis* (from the Latin *Hepar* – “liver” – and *-itis*, a medical term that means “inflammation”). The former name, *jaundice*, came to mean not the disease itself, but a symptom. Thus the perception moved from phenomenon to essence.

But sometimes the everyday and scientific understandings contradict each other. For example, the scientific idea of butterflies as a stage in the life cycle of lepidoptera contradicts the ancient idea of butterflies as the souls of witches, which is fixed in the internal form of the English word. We can see a discrepancy here between modern

ideas about certain object, which are contained in linguistic units, and the ancient ideas that are fixed in the internal forms of their names. This discrepancy reflects the evolution of views of the world. Although they do not typically stand in the way of an adequate understanding of reality.

Juri Lotman stressed on numerous occasions that culture and science are like the two eyes of humanity. They represent the world from two different yet coordinated vantage points – the conceptual (rational, logical) and the figurative (mythopoetic) – which together provide a “stereoscopic” image.

Conclusion

Speech thought, so to speak, moves along the lines of one’s picture of the world, which consists of images codified in a given ethnic culture. Figurative models of the essence of life phenomena can be interpreted literally (in the context of mythological consciousness) or as a poetic convention (in the context of enlightened consciousness). But, in any case, figurative representations of reality are characterized by their specificity against the background of conceptual representations.

The development of high technologies increases the scientific intensity of production and entails an overall increase in the level of education of the population. This is also facilitated by the media, which in many ways creates a modern picture of the world for a mass audience.

People today think less and less in the naïve categories of their everyday experience, coloured in small measure by the mythological, and even in everyday conditions, they increasingly look upon the world through the categories of science and technology. That is to say, our worldview – our picture of the world – is increasingly made up of rational thought. Yet, in the minds of native speakers of a given language and bearers of the culture of the country in which that language is spoken, the traditional picture of the world, which was formed over the course of thousands of years, is still relevant and coexists with the scientific and technological picture of the world. People are not computers – they cannot reflect reality using mathematical formulas and logic alone. Evolution has gifted people the ability to model the world around them in sensual images. Sensual images still form the basis of our perception of the world – the scientific and technological picture of the world rests on this foundation. Features of the scientific picture of the world are determined by the specifics of the human sensory apparatus. These ideas about the relationship between language, culture and knowledge of the world should be taken into account when mastering speech skills in a foreign language in order to approximate it to the authentic speech of native speakers of the language in question.

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The authors declare the absence of any conflicts of interests.

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